Rybin Yuri. An equation with one unknown, or again about the air victories of the aces of World War II. Snowboarding and master class
We were head and shoulders below
They had European experience.
So they taught us,
And having learned... we beat them.
T.D. Gusinsky
combat pilot 767 IAP air defense
The astute reader will immediately guess that the word “unknown” hides a plane shot down in an air battle. And he will be right. Probably, many still remember a small note, almost ten years ago, in the newspaper “Arguments and Facts” No. 16, 1990, in which, perhaps for the first time in Russia, a list of aerial victories of the most successful German aces in World War II was officially published. But it was she who gave rise to a long and passionate debate on the pages of numerous periodicals about the reliability of the three-digit battle accounts of our opponents.
The very method of confirming the downing of an aircraft in an air battle raised particular doubts. Many believe that the five main points of the Luftwaffe confirmation system cannot objectively and reliably reflect the likelihood of an aircraft being destroyed. The author fully shares this point of view.
Let me remind you what these points are: 1) the pilot’s report; 2) report of a direct witness (participants in the battle); 3) recommendation of the squadron commander; 4) a witness report from the ground; 5) film-film of a cinema machine gun. In particular, it was said that the first three reports did not cost anything to receive: they came from people who were very interested. Regarding the 4th point, examples were given of how often in combat conditions it was impossible to confirm the destruction of an enemy aircraft if the air battle took place over enemy territory, or over the water surface, etc. And, the last, 5th point: due to the imperfection of the photographic installation, which only worked at the moment of shooting, it also could not reflect the real picture of the damage and what followed - the plane crashed or returned safely to its airfield.
One cannot but agree with the convincing arguments, as well as real examples given in the articles, and, following their quite reasonable logic, it turned out that despite all the skill of the leading Luftwaffe aces, their mind-boggling accounts of air victories are nothing more than fiction. And in contrast to these “soapy” three-digit accounts, the authors presented the reader with more modest two-digit accounts of our Soviet aces, which, according to some, are even somewhat underestimated, since many of our aces, for a number of reasons, gave aerial victories to other pilots: to their wingmen - out of a sense of duty , to young pilots - to raise their morale, etc.
Summarizing the inconsistency of the combat accounts of the German aces and simultaneously analyzing whose aces were more effective, many authors cited as the main argument the fact that, in the end, the dispute about who fought better, the Germans or ours, was resolved on May 9, 1945 - in favor Red Army Air Force. And the final figure of 57,000 destroyed Nazi aircraft on the Soviet-German front out of 77,000 lost by the Germans indicated the indisputability of any final conclusion. This, or approximately this, is the current public opinion in our country regarding the fascist and Soviet aces of World War II.
Over the course of many years of research work related to a single theater of military operations in the Far North, having in hand well-verified lists of losses of both sides: units of the 5th Luftwaffe Air Fleet, based in Northern Finland and Norway, as well as the Air Force Northern Fleet, units of the 7th Air Army and the 122nd IAD Air Defense - the author came to conclusions of a slightly different nature.
First of all, what is alarming about these logical reflections is that their authors unconditionally question the accounts of German aces, but not the Soviet ones. Although it is well known that the Germans have one very characteristic and significant national feature - that very notorious German punctuality. The author experienced this very well himself, having lived in Germany for more than six years.
And if there is every reason to doubt this German pedantry, then what can we say about our “broad Russian nature”. But these, of course, are only the author’s subjective emotions, which, in particular, helped him correctly understand the origins of this or that case.
But what was the situation in the Red Army Air Force with the regulations by which downed enemy aircraft were determined and counted towards the combat accounts of Soviet pilots? The author was able to find only two such documents that guided the command of the Murmansk divisional air defense region. Both date from the 1942 period. Here is one of them, I will quote it in its entirety:
Extract from a letter from the Commander of the MDR Air Defense Colonel Ivanov to the Commander of the 122nd IAD dated 07/10/42:
In order to correctly account for downed aircraft and correct information, the High Command of the Red Army ordered the aircraft to be considered shot down after confirmation:
1. Posts VNOS * or NP anti-aircraft artillery;
2. Groups of pilots who saw the plane crash or the location of the plane crash identified by reconnaissance after the battle.
For final approval of the downing of an aircraft, it is necessary to submit material on the downed aircraft to the headquarters of the MDR Air Defense.
Commander of the MDR Air Defense Colonel Ivanov.
As can be seen from this document, instead of five points, like the Germans, in our Air Force in 1942 there were only two. True, the second paragraph included two definitions. But what is interesting to note is that the testimonies of the pilots who took part in the battle are in the same “weight” category as the item “the place where the enemy plane crashed.” That is, no matter how much you need to look for a downed plane, just confirmation of the participants in the battle is enough.
Of course, there was more than enough room for abuse in these definitions. This was quickly understood “at the top” and new additions soon appeared:
Extract from the order of MDR Air Defense, ref. No. 01932 dated 11/18/42:
In furtherance of the instructions of the Commander of the Air Defense Forces of the country's territory, the Commander of the MDR Air Defense ordered:
a) the place where the plane crashed;
b) photograph crashed plane;
c) data defining the type and belonging to the relevant part, number and other identification marks;
d) a report on the downing of an aircraft, signed by disinterested persons (not the part or unit that represents the report);
e) confirmation of VNOS posts.
2. For fighter aircraft:
a) a photograph of a downed plane;
b) confirmation of VNOS or NPZA posts.
4. In the documents submitted for the downing of the aircraft, indicate what signs and who confirms it.
5. Simultaneously with the act, submit all supporting documents. The submitted document must be accompanied by a completed diagram.
Without the submission and execution of the relevant documents, aircraft will not be considered shot down.
Chief of Staff of MDR Air Defense
Point No. 5 in this document is very interesting: which plane can be considered shot down. Without false modesty, any aircraft that went down sharply can be considered... But these were only separate regulatory documents, and in the subsequent war years, the accounting of downed enemy aircraft in the Red Army Air Force was tightened. For example, in 1944, without providing photographs or details of a downed aircraft, an aerial victory was not counted.
But in life, as we know, everything happens according to its own unwritten laws, and before moving on to bare facts and examples, let’s try to imagine for a moment and understand the essence of air combat itself. To do this, let us turn to the memories of our respected veterans, who more than once saw an enemy plane in the crosshairs of an optical sight, managed to survive this bloody war and live to this day.
Alexander Shevtsov was able to succinctly, objectively and quite accurately show in just a few sentences the specifics of air combat between fighters in the book “This is a Hard Summer”:
“And then everything started to turn around. It would be difficult for an uninitiated person to understand this mess. Because of the roar and howl of their own engines, the pilots did not hear the roar and howl of someone else’s, just as they did not hear the crackling of machine guns or even the bass clacking of cannons. And to be honest, in this deadly carousel it was not always easy to determine which “Messer” you were fighting with. Crosses and stars flashed in the air. Oh, how much the fighter had to see, understand, evaluate, weigh at the same time, and not seconds, but fractions of a second were allotted for everything.” 1
This passage shows very well that in a fierce, fleeting group battle it was not easy to monitor the actions of an individual enemy aircraft, and no one did this. After all, the main thing was, at least, not to let the enemy act with impunity and at the same time try not to let yourself be knocked down. Everything else (following instrument readings, remembering landmarks on the ground, watching where the plane you attacked was falling, etc.) was secondary.
This is the reality of any air battle and therefore at meetings with veterans, asking the same question: “Did you see how the enemy plane you attacked crashed and where it crashed (exploded) on the ground?” the author invariably received the same answer, that for the most part pilots in battle did not see the crash site. Perhaps the most categorical answer was given by the former pilot of the 768th IAP of the 122nd Air Defense Air Division, Boris Pavlovich Nikolaev, who defended the skies over Murmansk during the war: 2
“No one will ever tell you where the (enemy’s) plane fell. Any pilot sees that he has shot down, but he does not look at how he falls, where he falls, he looks first of all at the situation in the air...”
And here is another very interesting revelation that I received in a letter from a former pilot of the 767th IAP of the same air defense division, Timofey Demidovich Gusinsky:
“In battle, you see your turn, where it goes. When you hit, you immediately see changes in the flight of your victim. It will either roll without overload, or a lump of smoke will come off it, and subsequently a fire may break out. Well, let’s say there was no fire - it tilted and went down, in a dive. And at this moment the “one hundred and ninth” is sitting on your tail, but the distance is (still) respectable and it does not open fire on you. Why are you going to pursue your victim? It's clear that you are engaging in battle with your pursuer. And at home they ask you: “Show me the place where the one you shot down fell.” Moreover, in the tundra, where the landscape is the same everywhere. You know one thing: east or west of the Tuloma River - that’s all the landmarks. Yes, depending on what altitude the battle took place. You will not pursue the victim if the enemy’s superiority (on the side) of the enemy is to our detriment, and the loss of height is like death.
This is what happened to me after the battle on May 9, 1944. The squadron commander, Captain Nikulin, presented me with a choice: “If you don’t show the crash site of the 109th, then the headquarters will send a presentation to the Order of the Red Star.” If you show it, you will be awarded the Order of the Red Banner. I refused to lie and did not indicate the crash site of the Me-109, I did not see it...”
There is nothing surprising in these answers. If it were the other way around, that would be something that would be surprising. Of course, the rules also have their exceptions. And the author is sure that there will be veterans who will tell you in detail how they shot down a Messer or Junkers, how it, leaving a black trail behind it, fell to the ground and a huge smoky “mushroom” rose above it. But such memories will be relatively few.
Let us draw the first conclusion: the pilot who declared the destruction of an enemy aircraft in battle, in most cases did not see it fall. We will not consider the evidence of other participants in the battle, since many authors have rightly noted (though only in relation to the Germans) that they are interested parties, and therefore cannot be objective.
It would be appropriate to note here that while working with the daily operational reports of the 258th SAD, whose fighter regiments operated in the Murmansk direction, the author drew attention to one interesting thing. Sometimes after an air battle, the squadron commander, and sometimes even someone from the regiment command, flew to the indicated areas to search for pilots who had not returned from a combat mission and at the same time to check downed enemy aircraft. As a rule, in the first flight, and sometimes in subsequent ones, they did not find their downed planes and pilots, but invariably immediately, on the first flight, they found all the crash sites of enemy aircraft and thereby confirmed the reports of the pilots who returned from the battle. This gives me some thoughts.
Although there is nothing surprising here either. Let us imagine for a moment that at the head of the regiment there is a very principled person who, as required, without the necessary and reliable evidence from VNOS posts, ground command, and also without material evidence (i.e., certain parts or tags removed from the aircraft etc.) does not record downed enemy aircraft on the accounts of his subordinates, and therefore on the general combat account of the regiment. And the following picture emerges: neighboring regiments are fighting, their tally of victories invariably increases from battle to battle, but in this regiment, the count of combat losses invariably increases. I think that such a principled commander will not lead the regiment for long, not to mention his future career.
Many will ask, what about the reports of observers from VNOS posts or ground troops (if the battle took place over our territory), after all, they were the main witnesses in confirming the crash of the planes? We will talk about their role in this matter, since in practice everything turned out differently.
Who read the book by A.I. Pokryshkin “Sky of War”, they remember how in one of the first combat missions he attacked and shot down his Su-2 bomber. In reality, such cases in the skies of war were not isolated. As for enemy aircraft, until the very end of the war, pilots in air battles often made mistakes in determining the type of enemy aircraft. This also applied to experienced pilots. Here are some examples:
On April 19, 1943, Guard Junior Lieutenant Nikolai Bokiy, who by that time had 9 aerial victories, shot down the German ace Oberfeldwebel Müller, flying a Bf109G-2/R-6. Returning to his airfield, the pilot reported the destruction of the Focke-Wulf 190, which, as everyone knows, is strikingly different from the Messer from all angles.
On March 7, 1944, two “Air Cobras” of the 19th Guards IAP, led by Guard Junior Lieutenant Kuznetsov, flew out to intercept an enemy reconnaissance aircraft. Our fighters intercepted an enemy plane over the Kirov railway and, after several attacks, shot it down. Upon return, they reported the destruction of the Finnish Pe-2 and indicated the place of its crash. The next day, the plane was discovered by a search group, but it turned out to be a German Junkers-88 from the 1st squadron of the 124th long-range reconnaissance group (1.(AF)/124). It turns out that even in a relatively calm air battle, a two-fin aircraft can be confused with a single-fin aircraft.
What are these two examples? Here's what it's all about. If combat pilots were mistaken in determining the type of aircraft, then what could be demanded of the observers at VNOS posts. As you know, Red Army soldiers who were fit only for non-combatant service were usually sent to these “farms” (during the war years there was such a humorous decoding of the abbreviation VNOS - “drank, ate, slept again,” Ed.).
Now let’s look at how the VNOS post confirmation system worked in practice. Rarely did an air battle take place directly over the heads of observers and, as a rule, the aircraft conducting the battle moved, by earthly standards, considerable distances. Therefore, few people could follow the battle from the ground to the very end and indicate the exact place where the plane crashed. However, VNOS observation points on the approaches to Murmansk were quite sufficient. Most of them recorded the results of almost every air battle and the estimated squares of the crash sites, which were immediately reported by telephone to the headquarters of the Murmansk air defense brigade district (MPVO) 3.
On the same day, reports about downed aircraft were received by telephone from the air defense headquarters to the headquarters of the air divisions, and from there to the regiments. Based on these telephone reports, the following entries appeared in the division’s daily headquarters operational reports: “Confirmed by VNOS posts.”
But let's return again to the VNOS post. After the crash of the plane(s) was reported by telephone, a group (2-5 Red Army soldiers) was assigned from the post to search for the plane and pilots. This search could last more than one day and did not ultimately guarantee any results. But if the plane (or what was left of it) was discovered, then the finder wrote a detailed report (due to the diligence and literacy of the writer) 4 .
And now attention, the most interesting detail in the mechanism for confirming VNOS posts - it was at the moment of finding that the type of the fallen aircraft was determined. And previously, by telephone, if it was impossible to reliably determine the type of aircraft and its identity, according to an unwritten rule, any unidentified aircraft was considered enemy! Also, one cannot discount the human factor, when sometimes what was desired was passed off as reality. After all, every Soviet person wanted not ours, but the hated plane with crosses to fall to the ground.
Then the written report was received by command - to the platoon commander, the VNOS battalion commander, and from there to the MPVO headquarters, where it was filed in multi-volume files. The real information from these reports about the found aircraft, with the exception of individual cases, due to the fact that the air defense and the air force were different “farms”, was not received by the aviation units, and therefore was not taken into account.
Now it will become quite clear why, after the battle that took place on April 19, 1943, observers at VNOS posts reported the crash of four enemy aircraft, but in reality they were shot down... one Messerschmitt, one Airacobra and two Hurricanes. Let us note in passing that all participants in the battle stated that Guard Captain Sorokin shot down the fifth Messerschmitt, and although he was not confirmed by VNOS posts, he was also credited to the combat account of the future Hero of the Soviet Union 5.
Of course, one example is not enough to draw any conclusion. Perhaps this incident will seem uncharacteristic to someone for Soviet pilots. Therefore, I will give another “uncharacteristic” example, only now with “confirmation” from ground troops and other uninterested persons.
On one January day in 1944, when the “polar hunters” from the 5th Eismeer fighter squadron rarely appeared over Murmansk, the Pegmatit radar stations recorded a large number of targets heading towards the city. Three groups of Yak-7b and Yak-9 from the 122nd Air Defense Fighter Division were alerted, a total of 26 aircraft.
Soon the VNOS posts reported the approach of six Ju-87 bombers, accompanied by two six Me-109s. But when meeting with our fighters, the Junkers suddenly removed their landing gear and “turned” into “Messers.” A battle ensued, after which Soviet pilots announced the destruction of nine Me-109s. On our side, only one Yak-9 was shot down; the pilot, junior lieutenant Chelyshev from the 767th IAP, landed safely with the landing gear retracted at his airfield.
Judging by the available archival documents, all declared downed enemy aircraft were confirmed:
Downed planes are checked by going to the crash sites, but due to the difficulties of finding them in the hills, only 6 burned out and crashed enemy planes have been found so far. The remaining four are confirmed: 1 prisoner, three reports of pilots who shot down planes and other pilots, participants in the battle, who saw both the moments of the attacks and the crashes.
Me-109 - ml. Lieutenants Zubkov and Chernetsky of the 767th IAP. (Confirmed: by employees of Loparskaya station, by the head of the communications post; by reports of pilots Koryakin, Zubkov and Chernetsky);
Me-109 - ml. l-nt Round 767th IAP. (Confirmed by: Kruglov’s report, parachute passport, tag No. 109593; reports of pilots Fedorov and Ilyin);
Me-109 - ml. Lieutenants Levanovich and Ilyin of the 767th IAP. (Confirmed: Levanovich’s report, tag, wing console, compass and other burnt parts of the aircraft);
Me-109 - ml. l-nt Krivobokov 768th IAP. (Confirmed: reports of pilots Krivobokov, Kutuzov and Shpyrko);
Me-109 - ml. l-nt Skachkov 768th IAP. (Confirmed: reports of pilots Skachkov, Chelyshev and Babushkin);
Me-109 - ml. l-nt Krivobokov 768th IAP. (Confirmed: report of pilot Junior Lieutenant Krivobokov);
Me-109 - ml. Lieutenants Kuznetsov and Agafonov of the 769th IAP. (Confirmed: reports from Kuznetsov and Agafonov; certificate from the commander of 2/1082 ZAP and a report drawn up by the commander of military unit 35562);
Me-109 - Art. l-nt Gavrilov of the 769th IAP (Confirmed: tag No. 109552 6 and 50557, reports drawn up by the commander of military unit 39264; reports of pilots Chernenko and Kvashchuk);
Me-109 - Art. Lieutenant Nikulin and Junior Lieutenant Malyshev of the 769th IAP. (Confirmed: reports of Nikulin, Malyshev, tag No. 109553 6, act drawn up by the commander of military unit 35563);
Me-109 - ml. Lieutenant Fedorov of the 767th IAP. (Confirmed: reports of pilots Kruglov, Ilyin, Levanovich and Fedorov).
As can be seen from the documents presented above, of the nine downed aircraft, only four Me-109s can give rise to doubts, which are confirmed only by the reports of the participants in the battle. The remaining five have physical evidence or confirmation from outside observers and thus do not raise doubts about their authenticity. However, judging by the available lists of losses of the 5th Air Fleet, in reality on that day the German side lost only two Bf 109Gs. The pilot non-commissioned officer Wilhelm Strobel was wounded, but returned to his own, and the commander of the 9th detachment, Lieutenant Walter Klaus, was captured.
A few words about the lists of losses on the German side, since many readers will express doubts with righteous indignation regarding some lists of the enemy side. Can they be trusted?
First of all, it must be said that these lists were not compiled during the war years, when indeed, for various reasons, German headquarters, when reporting to higher authorities, often underestimated the combat losses of the units subordinate to them. By the way, the Germans themselves admit this fact.
But in our time, there are other lists of losses that were compiled by historian-researchers on the basis of numerous archival documents - loss logs, combat reports, combat journals, etc. Over the course of dozens of post-war years, they were constantly supplemented and refined. Currently, they reflect the real picture of combat losses in air battles, and also take into account those shot down by fire, those missing in action and those killed in disasters.
To be honest, only once did the author have some doubts. This case is directly related to our topic. Studying from archival documents the combat activities of the 20th Guards IAP, in which such famous fighter pilots as Heroes of the Soviet Union V.I. Krupsky, P.S. Kutakhov and A.S. Khlobystov, the author was faced with an amazing fact.
In the history of this regiment, one of the air battles was inscribed, as they say, in “golden letters.” Soviet pilots demonstrated their skill, mutual assistance, self-sacrifice, and in a difficult, bloody battle inflicted great damage on the enemy, after which enemy aircraft did not appear in the area of our airfields for a long time. All participants in this significant battle were awarded orders and medals. Guard Major Gromov, at that time commander of the 1st squadron, who led this battle and shot down two Messerschmitts, was presented with the Order of Lenin.
In total, it was announced that eight Me-109s were destroyed, with their own losses: five pilots were killed, three were wounded, seven Kittyhawks were shot down, three were shot down, two of which underwent major repairs.
When the author turned to the above lists, it turned out that on that day the 5th Eismeer squadron had no losses at all! It was simply hard to believe. Fortunately for the author, in Murmashi, exactly where this battle took place, one of its participants, Nikitin Ivan Mikhailovich, lived. Then he was wounded in the leg, but managed to reach his airfield and land safely.
Ivan Mikhailovich’s story was fascinating, with a lot of interesting and shocking details that were not included in either the operational summary or the official description of the battle in the “Journal of Combat Experience of the 20th Guards IAP.” At the end of the story, as always, a tactless question was asked: “Have you seen with your own eyes at least one falling or burning fascist plane in this battle?” To which Ivan Mikhailovich, smiling slyly, replied: “When I left the hospital, in a solemn atmosphere in front of the formation, I was awarded the medal “For Courage.” Handing over the award, the regimental chief of staff whispered in my ear: “Oh, we never found a single Messer...
Probably, in this case, it was beneficial for the command of the guards regiment, against the backdrop of such heavy losses, to present a fictitious picture of the battle, and to compensate the surviving pilots for the pain of the loss of their comrades with an abundance of awards.
What conclusion can be drawn from this? I don’t know how things were in other theaters of military operations, but apparently in the Far North, the pilot’s report was (more often than it might seem at first glance) the main evidence and the only point in the system of confirming enemy aircraft destroyed in air combat. Another one for that shining example - last Stand B.F. Safonov, when he reported on the radio that three Yu-88s were destroyed at once over convoy PQ-16, and to this day (judging by the press) no one doubts this fact.
Speaking about the imperfection of the confirmation system in our Air Force, perhaps it would not be amiss to show the case when a really downed aircraft was confirmed according to all the rules by VNOS posts or other ground observers. I present to the attention of the readers the report of the pilot who shot down an enemy plane, and he is one of the most successful aces of the Arctic - Pavel Stepanovich Kutakhov, whose name does not require any additional introduction (original spelling):
“To the commander of the 19th Guards IAP, Guards Major Novozhilov
I am reporting to you that today, March 27, 1943, in an air battle that began at low level in the area of Lake. Home and (in) the balance of enemy forces 4 Me-109G (against) our 3 Airacobras. From the first attack, I shot down one Me-109G on a turn, which immediately left the battle and went to the northwest. In the unfolding air battle on the verticals, I took advantage of the peculiarity of my vehicle, in comparison with the vehicles of Silaev and Lobkovich, to break away from them and began to fight above my own at 600-1000 m with two Me-109G. They made a coup after a 15-minute battle and launched an attack on Lobkovich and Silaev. I followed them from behind, grabbed Lobkovich from under his tail and began to pursue the Me-109G, which tried to get away from me for 4-5 minutes during horizontal and vertical maneuvers. I carried out attacks from short distances from behind from above and from behind from below, in the upper vertical position the Me-109 was shot down, but after making a coup, I lost it in camouflage. The posts reported his landing, the pilot was captured.
Commander of the 1st IE Guards. Major Kutakhov"
And here is a memo confirming the head of the ground team, who became an involuntary witness to this air battle:
“To the commander of the 19th Guards IAP
from the Head of Technical Team No. 42 RAB, senior technician-lieutenant Tishchenko
I inform you that my reconnaissance discovered an enemy aircraft of the Me-109G fighter type No. 657, shot down by your pilots on 03/28/43. Your Airacobra aircraft tail number 10 pursued this Me-109G aircraft and fired at it in the area of Lake Tyukhmenskoye, then your pilot stopped the pursuit, thinking that the enemy had left, (but) in fact the Me-109G fell into the forest and exploded and burned in area 3 km east of Lake Domashnee. The second Me-109G aircraft was discovered by a reconnaissance group 5 km northeast of the lake. Homemade. The aircraft number could not be determined. The plane burned down. Shot down in battle by your pilots on 03/12/43. The moments of the fall of these planes were observed by my scouts, who were in search of other emergency planes.
The signature of senior technician-lieutenant Tishchenko certifies
Head of the combat department and personnel of the 6th BAO, Lieutenant Gusev"
And although not everything in these documents coincides and there are some inaccuracies (in particular, the serial number of the Messerschmitt is not entirely accurately rewritten), nevertheless, Guard Major Kutakhov actually shot down a Bf 109G-2, piloted by non-commissioned officer Edmund Krishovsky. The next day, a German pilot in the Urd-Lake area was captured. In this battle, the pilots of the 19th Guards IAP dealt with the aces of the famous 6th detachment of the 5th fighter squadron “Eismeer” (6./JG 5).
From all of the above, I would not like to make any global generalizations. But, nevertheless, the author made one main conclusion for himself; due to the inevitable specifics of air combat, the list of declared aerial victories of any ace, no matter on which side he fought, does not correspond to the number of aircraft he actually shot down. But to what extent it does not correspond needs to be determined individually for each pilot. However, in total mass, some pattern can still be traced. According to rough calculations, the ratio of actually downed aircraft to declared ones lies in the range from 1:3 to 1:4.
The lists of victories of some of our aces below confirm these ratios. But here it should be noted that some aircraft shot down and confirmed by the opposing side can be claimed not only by other participants in the air battle, but also by anti-aircraft gunners, and in some cases, by ordinary soldiers who fired rifles and machine guns at enemy aircraft. Therefore, only in rare cases can we say with complete confidence that such and such a pilot shot down this particular plane.
Thus, in the list of Guard Lieutenant Colonel Boris Feoktistovich Safonov, of the eight air victories confirmed by the German side, only four can claim with full confidence that it was he who won them.
I would also like to add a few words about the planes shot down in the group. Judging by the way they are invariably indicated with a plus in almost all lists of air victories of our pilots published to date, you involuntarily begin to believe that these numbers mean something. Although in reality, there is absolutely nothing behind these numbers.
During the war years, the practice of recording group victories somehow justified itself. Well, first of all, this was one of the incentives for our pilots to strive to fight in a group, since in individual battles we suffered huge losses. And in some regiments, non-flying political instructors, in their instructions on how to fight correctly, went so far as to place an enemy plane shot down in a group as higher in importance than one shot down by someone alone.
The entries in the logbook of downed enemy aircraft of the 20th Guards IAP for 1941-1942 are very eloquent. Here are some of them:
Pilots: Art. l-nts Kontsevoy, Khlobystov, But, Gorelyshev, senior s-nt Bychkov, s-nts Chibisov, Petelin, Zurov in an air battle in the region of the lake. Piaveyavr was shot down - 1 Me-110, 2 Me-109 and 3 Yu-87. Confirmed by VNOS posts.
Pilots: Mr. Gromov, art. l-nts Gorelyshev, Khlobystov, Kotov, Krymsky, Yurilin shot down 2 Me-109s in an air battle in the Bolshaya Zapadnaya Litsa area. Confirmed by ground forces.
Pilots: Art. Lt. Khlobystov, Gorelyshev, Krymsky, Yurilin, Lt. Lomakin, Krutikov village shot down 1 Me-109 in an air battle in the Bolshaya Zapadnaya Litsa area. Confirmed by ground forces.
Pilots: Mr. Solomonov, Art. Political instructor Seleznev, Art. Lt. Kontsevoy, Yurilin, Krymsky, political instructor Zharikov, Lt. Pshenev, from Krug village in the area of Lake Odezh-Yavr shot down 1 Yu-88. Confirmed by VNOS posts.”
And here is another interesting entry in the same journal, which causes even more bewilderment:
Pilots: Senior Lieutenants Khlobystov and Gorelyshev, together with pilots of the 145th IAP, shot down 4 Me-109s in an air battle in the Bolshaya Zapadnaya Litsa region” (there is no record of confirmation of VNOS posts or ground troops - Author’s note).
If in the previous records it is not clear only what pilot and how many specific planes were recorded as being shot down in the group, then in this record, in addition to everything else, it is not even clear - what regiment are these four “downed” Me-109s in the group actually credited to? And who can say how many stars should be painted on board the planes that took part in this battle - one or four? I think we won’t be mistaken if we assume that all four of these “downed” Me-109s were recorded on the accounts of both the 145th and 147th air regiments. On the scale of the division, which included these regiments, this figure was already automatically doubled, and in the divisional reports not four, but already eight downed Messerschmitts would appear. But the most interesting thing is that in reality the Germans had no losses at all that day.
At the same time, we must not forget that the regiment command, as well as particularly distinguished pilots, quite often had to attend various meetings of residents of cities whose population suffered severely from enemy bombing. And the commissar proudly said that such and such a pilot, in a battle with the hated fascist invaders, personally shot down three enemy planes and ten in a group, and such and such a pilot personally shot down five and fifteen in a group... Such figures, of course, were impressive.
Many photographs have been preserved of our pilots posing in front of their planes, in which one or two filled-in stars are clearly visible for enemy planes shot down individually, and about two dozen “empty” stars for planes shot down in a group.
Alexander Shevtsov, already mentioned in this article, left very interesting memories, in which he clearly showed the attitude of the pilots of the 19th Guards IAP to this issue:
“And then Kutakhov’s five landed. Excited pilots reported to the regiment commander: the group of enemy aircraft had been scattered, the bombing of Murmansk had been disrupted. Four enemy aircraft were shot down in an air battle. Ours are all intact.
Who should be credited with downed planes?
For everyone! Shot down by a group.
Why at all? I shot down one Messer. I shot at him, comrade commander. And he fell.
And I shot,” said Kutakhov.
However, I am not asking you to write it down for me. Yes, and Bochkov shot.
They returned from the command post gloomy and angry. In the evening, guys from other squadrons came to the first squadron: Volodya Gabrinets, Kolya Gubin, the lively and always laughing Vanyushka Gaidaenko. And somehow imperceptibly the conversation revolved around Krivosheev’s plane. At first in the form of individual remarks or caustic remarks, then more and more loudly and sharply. And finally, it resulted in a “male conversation” in which it was decided that only the plane that the pilot destroyed independently, without the help of others, would be considered personally shot down. Still, write down the rest as if they were shot down by a group.”
Having lightly crushed each other, the pilots in due time figured out which downed enemy aircraft were to be counted in the group and which were not. But what should we do? If 2/3 of the declared aircraft shot down personally are not confirmed at all, then what can we say about those shot down in a group? And anyway, where did they come from - shot down in a group? How can this Soviet collective accounting be logically explained, if this was not the case at all in other warring powers (Here you can argue with the respected author, see the article “Accounting for air combat.” Ed. note).
Here are those cases that lend themselves to a logical explanation: the first is when the number of fallen “enemy” planes, according to reports from VNOS posts, was higher than the number declared by the pilots in an air battle. This difference was recorded for all pilots participating in the battle. The second is that absolutely all downed planes declared by the pilots, confirmed and not confirmed by VNOS posts, were signed by the participants in the battle.
But, as with every rule, there are exceptions. Thus, the author managed to find several cases when one enemy plane was actually shot down in a group. Basically, these are those episodes when everything is extremely clear: there is one enemy aircraft (usually a reconnaissance aircraft), and several of our fighters attack it in turn.
So, on June 27, 1941, three of our I-16s, the leading flight commander of the 72nd SAP Major Gubanov and his wingmen - Senior Lieutenant Safonov and Lieutenant Antipin, having discovered the German reconnaissance aircraft Henschel-126 in the ranks of their SB bombers, attacked it. After repeated attacks, the North Sea pilots jointly managed to shoot down the enemy 8 . Of course, this destroyed plane was recorded in the flight books of the above-mentioned pilots as being shot down in a group battle.
If such a case had occurred among the Germans, then the air victory would have been credited to only one pilot, that is, to the one after whose attack the enemy plane crashed to the ground. Of course, a mistake is possible here, since the attack of the previous pilot could have been more effective, but the Luftwaffe did not have deliberately exaggerated numbers of air victories.
At the conclusion of the article, as required by the genre of historical investigation, the author must draw an appropriate conclusion; compare some generalized figures, on the basis of which it would become obvious whose aces were more productive and whose list of victories should ultimately be longer.
The author suggests looking at this issue from the other side - whose losses were higher, which means the list of actually downed aircraft will be longer for the opposite side. From here, each reader will draw his own conclusion. To do this, I propose to compare the losses of Soviet and Nazi aviation during the successful offensive operation in the Far North in the period from October 7 to November 1, 1944, when our aviation already completely dominated the skies of the Arctic.
For direct participation in the operation, 747 combat aircraft were involved from the 7th Air Army, of which 308 fighters (54 La-5, 30 LaGG-3, 67 Yak-9, 32 Yak-76, 19 Yak-1, 81 P- 39Q, 25 P-40E and N), in addition, the Northern Fleet Air Force participated - 275 aircraft, of which 160 fighters (18 Yak-7b, 4 Yak-9, 105 P-39Q, 33 P-40N). A total of 1,022 combat aircraft, including 468 fighters.
The German aviation group of the 5th Air Fleet, opposing the Soviet Air Force in the Far North, then consisted of 66 fighters of the 3rd and 4th groups of the 5th fighter squadron “Eismeer” (III. and IV./JG 5). In total, 169 combat aircraft were based at sea and land airfields beyond the Arctic Circle.
Thus, the ratio of fighters was approximately 1:7, of course, not in favor of the Luftwaffe. However, in air battles alone, our side lost 66 aircraft to enemy fighters, including 39 fighters. The enemy lost 25 aircraft from our fighters, of which only 12 were fighters. The total combat losses were: 142 aircraft on our side and 63 on the Germans; 61 and 19 pilots died, respectively. There is no need to invent any complex and intricate systems for calculating the performance of a particular pilot, as some authors do. The above figures speak for themselves, who fought better and whose list of aerial victories should be longer.
As you can see, these figures also indicate that the enemy was not defeated, contrary to what is written in many books devoted to the air war in the North.
Of course, now we can say that the enemy was cunning and did not engage in “fair” open fights, that bad weather played into the hands of the German pilots, that the enemy’s airfield network was more developed, but the fact remains that the “polar hunters” in the skies of the Arctic once again demonstrated their advantage and, after defeat on the land front, almost in full force relocated to airfields on the western coast of Norway. There, new Bf 109G-14 and FW 190 F-8 fighters were already waiting for them, on which they continued combat operations against the British Royal Air Force.
In conclusion, I would like to urge fellow historians to move up a notch in their works and stop copying well-known facts from each other, which are supposedly supposed to promote the heroism and high skill of Soviet pilots. Almost every such publication mentions cases when our illustrious ace No. 1 Ivan Kozhedub shot down a fascist Me-262 jet in the skies of Germany or pilot Alexander Horovets over the Kursk Bulge shot down nine Ju-87 bombers at once in one battle, etc.
I will not reveal a big secret, saying that in every shot down enemy plane there was a pilot who had a military rank, first and last name, and the plane belonged to one or another squadron, group, squadron. Of course, establishing all these parameters will require additional time and painstaking research work. But at some point it is necessary to name everyone by name, especially since more accurate and specific information will not diminish the significance of the feat of our pilots, but on the contrary will only increase. Although some will be disappointed, since many of the exploits glorified by Soviet propaganda will remain only beautiful legends.
Here is one of them, invented, I emphasize, not by the pilot himself, but by those who were supposed to do this by their occupation and position. Three rams in one battle, and two rams were carried out by one pilot (A.S. Khlobystov) - sounds great and inspires new reckless actions. But if you think about it sensibly, is it possible to shoot down a heavy twin-engine Me-110 with just the right console of a single-engine R-40S fighter, and then use it to shoot down a Me-109? Theoretically, it’s probably possible to shoot down more, but practically, it’s unlikely.
Indeed, the German side confirms only one ram in this battle, but not of senior lieutenant A.S. Khlobystov, and his commander, regimental navigator Captain A.P. Pozdnikov, who died in a head-on collision with a Messerschmitt 110, whose pilot, Lieutenant Karl-Friedrich Koch, made an emergency landing and returned safely with the gunner-radio operator to his airfield. (It is not clear who Khlobystov “broke off” the wing of his “Kittyhawk” against, which is clearly visible in the photograph in the article. Note ed., there is no photo on the website).
But here is a “fable” in the style of hunting stories that used to be large quantities were published on the pages of the magazines “Wings of the Motherland” and “Aviation and Cosmonautics”.
The article, under the common title “Duel,” described how a North Sea pilot shot down the famous German ace Major Moebus in the skies of the Arctic over the Barents Sea on June 8, 1944, who had 74 aerial victories to his name. The article also said that this ace always flew alone, and a dragon was painted on his Messerschmitt 109. To confirm that this ace died in battle, a reference was made (a rare case!) to the Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet, which published an obituary.
Indeed, in Northern Finland in June 1944, Major Martin Mobus (Martin Modus), commander of the 1st group of the 5th attack squadron (I./SG 5), holder of the Knight's Cross and Oak Leaves, died. True, not in battle, but in a car accident, and not on the eighth of June, but on the second. Yes, and he never flew a Messerschmitt, since all of his combat activity took place on Ju-87 dive bombers. And his grave is not in the cold waters of the Barents Sea, but in the Rovaniemi military cemetery in Finland.
Perhaps, it was not out of nowhere that it was noticed back in ancient times that people never lie as much as after a hunt and during a war, which many authors simply forgot about.
* VNOS - aerial surveillance, warning and communications. NP - observation post.
1 During the war, Alexander Shevtsov was a correspondent for the divisional aviation newspaper. He made 48 combat missions, 24 of them on an Il-2 attack aircraft as an air gunner, which gave him the opportunity to competently describe an air battle.
2 B.P. Nikolaev has 5 enemy aircraft shot down in its combat account. On 03/27/43, in a battle over Murmansk, he rammed a Bf 109F-4 (WNr.7544), he himself escaped by parachute, and the German pilot died.
3 Since January 1942 - Murmansk divisional air defense region; from 10/27/1943 - Murmansk air defense corps region.
4 The search for downed planes and pilots was also carried out by border guards, whose outposts operated throughout the war, but their reports went through other channels and, naturally, did not reach the air defense and air force headquarters.
5 For complete objectivity, it should be noted that at the same time in the area of the lake. Two Yak-9s of the 20th IAP of the Northern Fleet Air Force fought an air battle with two Me-109s. As a result, junior lieutenant Shevchenko announced the downing of one Me-109, and Lieutenant Turganov - one FW-190. (This is also an interesting detail, he fought with the Me-109, and reported that he shot down the FW-190).
6 These are tags from one plane.
7 Killed on 09/09/42 in an air battle after ramming a Bf 109F-4 head-on, German pilot Chief Corporal Günter Hoffmann from 6./JG 5 also died. E.A. Krivosheev was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
9 Ns 126B WNr.3395 from 1. (H)/32, pilot Fw Herbert Kern went missing, observer Lt Paul-Heinz Becker was killed.
More recently, Yuri Rybin delighted fans athletics victories in the All-Union, All-Russian and international arenas, and yesterday the eminent javelin thrower celebrated his 50th birthday. On the eve of the anniversary, the LSG correspondent visited Rybin, asked about the present day and remembered the past...
I haven’t seen Yuri Rybin for a long time, but over the years since our last meeting, he has hardly changed: friendly, smiling, polite. Yuri hasn’t changed and outwardly, at least, you’ll never give him fifty!
Snowboarding and master class
He now lives in the suburbs of Lipetsk - in the village of Nikolskoye, which is along the Chaplygin highway. All around is nature, space and beauty. By the way, the place for the house was not chosen by chance - at one time he went snowboarding on a local slope, which he became attached to after parting with athletics. I liked the place, and as a result, the foundation of the future house was laid here.
This was about ten years ago, and it was then that Yuri Rybin decided that it was time to quit big sports:
It was February 2003, and the traditional Russian winter long throw championship was taking place in Adler. I failed to achieve anything at these competitions and, on the eve of my 40th birthday, I realized: this is the limit, my body does not listen to me, I have exhausted my resource in throwing the javelin. And he left the sport. Quiet, no wires.
But move, lead active image I didn’t stop living. Almost immediately I started boarding - first on the water, then on the snow. Gradually he even became a kind of master in these types. At least I get great pleasure from the process! What else does a person need?
Have you ever wanted to try yourself as a coach or sports organizer?
Why? I still worked in sports for two years. I tried to find myself, so to speak, in my specialty - a coach, an instructor in the gym. By the way, over time I developed a slightly skeptical attitude towards the halls. IN confined space Even an hour drags on for a long time, sometimes you think: when will this end? And on fresh air and two hours of classes fly by...
So, after working as an instructor, I realized: no, this is not for me. And then friends who were already doing business with all their might offered to work with them. I agreed and... now I can safely call myself a builder. The first facility that was built with my participation and under my leadership was a shopping center on Gagarin Street, in the area of the former oil depot. You could say that we turned a garbage dump in the city center into a decent place... Little by little I began to get involved and learn. Now I have already built several objects, each of which I can be proud of.
I never thought that my line of work would change so diametrically. But I don’t regret anything. Although you have to work, especially during busy times for builders, 10-12 hours a day. But this is where sports training helps! After all, in sports it was the same: the main thing is the goal, and to achieve it you should not pay attention to the effort expended, achieve it at any cost.
So sporting beginning I haven't gotten anywhere. He remained stubborn as he was. The only thing is that by the age of fifty, my shoulder, worn out by years of training, began to ache. Now I probably won’t even be able to conduct a master class in javelin throwing - my shoulder won’t allow it...
Advanced South Africa and backward Russia
When Yuri and I began to sort through the whole heap of his awards, which he took out of the box, the ex-Russian record holder and two-time participant in the world championships complained:
I have long wanted to set up something like a home museum, hang medals on the wall. But I didn’t do it in time, and now I think: maybe there’s no point. Even the following thoughts come to mind: I haven’t put the awards on display yet, which means I’m still young! If only we had a good sports museum in our city, we would give some of the awards to it: let young people watch and be like our generation...
Have you lost interest in athletics? Do you keep in touch with your sports friends?
Necessarily. I follow javelin throwing, and not only it, via the Internet, and I regularly call my friends and teammates on the national team and the Luch club. With the same Andrei Moruev, with Misha Sadov. And Marina Zhirova came to visit not so long ago. She is now big man in the Moscow region - deputy of the Balashikha Council and director of the local Meteor stadium.
In the summer, by the way, I’m going to go to the World Championships, which will be held in Moscow. This is a great opportunity not only to watch the competition, but also to see old friends.
Do you follow Lipetsk sports? How would you assess his condition?
It is very pleasant that an athletics arena was finally built in Lipetsk last year. I haven’t visited it yet, though - I don’t have time. But for young people this is a great gift.
Yuri Valentinovich RYBIN. Born March 5, 1963. Master of Sports of the USSR of international class, ex-Russian record holder in the javelin throw (86.98 m). Finalist of the 1995 World Championships in Gothenburg (7th place - 81.00 m), participant of the 1993 World Championships in Stuttgart. Winner of the European team championship as part of Luch (Moscow). Two-time champion USSR, seven-time champion of Russia. Married.
Latest news from the Lipetsk region on the topic:
Yuri RYBIN: “For me the glass is half full”
Lipetsk
Heart-to-heart Photo - A. Evstropov Just recently, Yuri Rybin delighted athletics fans with victories in the All-Union, All-Russian and international arenas, and yesterday the eminent javelin thrower celebrated his 50th birthday.
13:07 03/06/2013 Lipetsk sports newspaper
Yuri RYBIN: “For me the glass is half full”- Lipetsk
Just recently, Yuri Rybin delighted athletics fans with victories in the All-Union, All-Russian and international arenas, and yesterday the eminent javelin thrower celebrated his 50th birthday.
11:33 06.03.2013
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Yuri Rybin
NON-VIRTUAL RYBIN
The life of an athlete is constant travel, training camps, and competitions. But geographical movements are only its purely external side. We know much less about the inner world of an athlete. Meanwhile, each training session is the result of long reflection, the choice of methodology, the search for something new and the tedious, repeated repetition of what has been learned. Each competition is a tough clash of strength, the characters of athletes who fight for the honor of the country and for personal benefits. And, no matter what they say, it is not yet known which component is more important.
The javelin thrower needs to put the enormous power of his mighty body into a single effort lasting only a fraction of a second. And the strength is truly incredible. There is such a term - “hit the spear”, meaning the correct investment of effort into the axis of the projectile. And in photographs I could see that when this does not happen, the spear literally bends into an arc. Rybin, accustomed to such energy in his own performance, once spoke with surprise about the incident on the plane. After a multi-hour flight, Russian record holder Sergei Makarov, sitting in front, stretched with pleasure, stretching his arms up. Yuri, as a joke, held him by the wrists and suddenly felt that with some effort his neighbor could easily pull him out of the chair. And seat belts wouldn't help.
Yuri likes to compete. Even during training. I remember several years ago as a sparring partner in strength exercises he happened to have a famous bodybuilder in Russia, Oleg Kopylov. Oleg worked properly with the weights. I remember the photograph in which he was depicted with a barbell on his shoulders. Richly hung with “pancakes”, the bar even bent, but the strongman held the weight. There were more than three hundredweight in that rod. And Rybin chose this “monster” as his partner. Both are groovy, they pushed each other to extreme weights. An important element of training is the shot throw. But the seven-kilogram iron ball seemed a little light to them, and they found a replacement for it - a broken weight without handles. This was what we needed. And a pound piece of iron flew to their delight, like a child’s balloon...
He thinks paradoxically. Everyone knows how many problems athletes have due to injuries. During his twenty-year career, fortunately, Yuri did not have any serious injuries. I tell him it’s great, I haven’t missed a single season. And I hear in response: “Maybe this is bad - sometimes we need to stop, think, change something. And so we had to chase victories without a break.”
Constant, for two decades, victories at national championships, regular successes at international tournaments made his name on the world stage. It seems like a little more - and the result will be top-notch. Achieved: first he threw the javelin at 84.52 meters, then at 86.98 - Russian records. Made it to the finals of the World Championship, and this is the elite. But he has a higher dream - Olympic Games. Throughout my career I was part of the national team - first the USSR, then Russia, I was always a candidate for participation in the main competition, but... When I didn’t make it to the Olympic Games in Seoul, back in 1988, I wasn’t particularly upset, because I was initially determined to long sports career, which means it will be in time. However, the next games in Barcelona took place without Rybin, and the next ones, in Atlanta, were also not seen by the Lipetsk team. And now he understands perfectly well that the current chance in Sydney is the last.
All life is subject to this. Yes, now in something lighter. He, an elite athlete, is invited to a serious training camp. To Chile, South Africa, Spain. But, as with everything, you have to pay for something good. And well-organized training camps in Turkey are accompanied by the constant presence of an armed soldier - at the stadium, in the hotel, on the bus. It's a small thing, but it's annoying. This is how Chechnya comes back...
Successes, impressions, experience and - age. Rybin is 37. Does this have an effect? When communicating with Yuri during training, outside sports arenas, you note his former determination and energy. But this is external. The athlete himself admitted that he realizes that time is working against him. This is not the first time, starting the preparatory period for the next season, that I have been tormented by doubts: is it worth it? What is all this for? However, there is a goal, and Rybin again harnesses the burden of preparation. But the question has not sunk into oblivion; it will still arise before every training session, before every approach to a heavy barbell, before every departure for a training camp that seems so attractive. Sometimes there is not enough emotion (this is the always cheerful and friendly Rybin!), and he tries to compensate for the deficiency with music. It has become an indispensable attribute training process performed by our javelin thrower. Active, that is, with a built-in amplifier, speakers, a laser disc player, and headphones always find a place in an athlete’s training bag. Surprisingly, it is not light pop music that supports you in hard, tedious work, but completely different music. Knowing well Rybinsk's previous passions - rock, catchy dance rhythms, I was somewhat surprised to see in the music box discs not only of modern classics - Queen, Deep Purple, but also Luciano Pavarotti, Placido Domingo, Bach. And I heard the explanation: “I don’t need to push my muscles, but my soul. But only complex music reaches her.”
The meaning of sport is victory. It is clear, first of all, over oneself, over one’s own weaknesses, but also over specific rivals, who have no less talent, and the goal of life is the same - victory. They need to be resisted, and Rybin succeeds. Little by little, little by little, he creates a good - winning - mood for himself. And he goes about this in a seemingly most irrational way, doing good deeds for others. I don’t think I’ll be wrong in saying that there was no such case when Yuri drove past an acquaintance in a car without offering him a ride. And it will definitely be on his way. And when it turns out that he is in the other direction, he will smile: “It’s not me who’s driving the car.” And so it is in everything.
We have read more than once about the wives of military men, astronauts, and sailors. But the athletes’ companions also deserve the warmest words. Yuri, talking about his Irina, answered simply - we have an understanding at the level of genes, after all, we have been together for more than twenty years. Therefore, they part with sadness before the next training camp, meet with joy, sincerely celebrate victories and experience defeats together.
However, at home there is often no time for emotions: so much stuff accumulates before arrival that you can only dream about relaxation. And the venerable champion carries out not only urgent matters, but also, so to speak, super-programmatic ones. The parquet he laid himself and the furniture he made himself are his pride.
And one more topic that cannot be ignored when communicating with world-class athletes is pharmacology. There are so many rumors, opinions, facts and scandals related to doping that I asked this question, as they say, head-on. Rybin answered immediately and without a shadow of embarrassment: “I’m taking nootropil.” (From the medical reference book: nootropil - increases the energy metabolism of brain cells, developing their potential neurophysiological capabilities).
And he was in no hurry to change the topic of conversation, he talked about doubts, numerous options for methods, approaches regarding training volumes and intensity. On the one hand, everything is simple: repeat the training model of the preparatory period preceding a successful competitive season, and no problems. But just as you cannot step into the same river twice, two years cannot be the same. Therefore, the constant companions of an athlete’s not at all festive, hard work are not only training and competitions, but also constant doubts and the search for new ways to victory. We, fans, are no help in these matters. The only thing we need is to wish you good luck. In the only way, but extremely necessary. So, good luck, Yuri!
June, 2000
